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Historiography
Jeroen Duindam
Leiden University
Abstract
This paper examines the particulars of ‘early modern’ as well as ‘European’ political
history in terms of chronological and spatial divides. Most political historians of early
modern Europe and its component states are far removed from classic teleological
approaches based on national state formation and modernization. On the whole, how-
ever, a pragmatic national orientation of research based on the proximity of sources and
the language capabilities of researchers remains strong, even if it is combined with
transnational conceptual gestures. Moreover, the demands of specialized historical
research lead to concentration on relatively brief periods: only rarely do we find
research reaching from the sixteenth into the eighteenth century. In consequence,
while well-worn conventional divides in time as well as in space have few staunch
advocates, they tenaciously remain in place. The political history of European states,
full of untested reputations, needs a comparative perspective. This will work only if it is
based on symmetrical comparison and analysis of primary sources: comparison founded
on secondary literature threatens to reinforce national cliche´s. European history, finally,
finds its place only in contrast with other variants of global history. A global comparative
perspective presents daunting challenges for researchers, but it is an inevitable and
necessary component of the reassessment of European history, modernization, and
period labels.
Keywords
early modern, national state, modernization, historiography
The European History Quarterly’s invitation to reﬂect on the temporal and regional
divides in early modern European history sparked a searching and inconclusive
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monologue inte´rieur on my part, raising a number of questions that many historians
will have asked themselves. What is European history? Can I qualify as a historian
of Europe? Is Europe a pertinent and viable category for historical research? What
is the speciﬁc importance of the European dimension for early modern history? The
idea of Europe has been examined in several impressive studies; many overviews
cover Europe as a whole, whereas numerous studies concentrate on speciﬁc inter-
actions among European regions from cultural, social, or economic perspectives.1
Lacking a synoptic overview of such works I take my own research on the dynastic
court in France, the Austrian Habsburg territories, the Holy Roman Empire, and
more recently Asian empires, as a starting point. The following remarks focus on
political history, the key domain of the ﬁrst generations of academic historians, still
seen by a considerable number of historians as the discipline’s core territory. The
political history of the early modern age was traditionally dominated by the par-
adigm of national state building. Although a revisionist consensus taking distance
from classic national and statist views emerged in the second half of the twentieth
century, political historians of early modern Europe have experienced greater dif-
ﬁculty in ﬁnding viable alternatives to a national approach than their counterparts
in cultural or social history.
Early Modern Europe: A Pathway to Modernity?
The term ‘early modern’, a relatively recent invention, implies a revision of the
classic interpretation of the rise of modernity as well as a hushed continuation of
that interpretation. This uncomfortable midway station acknowledges fundamental
changes at the extremes of the period 1500–1800, without usually deﬁning the
characteristics of the intermediate ages with great clarity – a new medium aevum
between the Middle Ages no longer pictured as irredeemably static and a Modern
Age retaining many elements of the ancien re´gime.2 Things looked far more
straightforward in the nineteenth century, when prophets of modernity from
Hegel to Marx categorized European history around 1500 as the dawn of a new
age. Economic innovation, rising middle classes, expanding geographical horizons,
rationality and political liberty, opened the doors of modernity. Many nineteenth-
century scholars, moreover, viewed the preceding centuries through the prism of
the polarized political contests of their age, idealizing the forces of progress and in
the process burdening twentieth-century historians with an anachronistic and tel-
eological legacy.
Leftovers of this tradition can still be found in school textbooks, repeating the
curious notion that people ‘started thinking’ or ‘started thinking for themselves’
roughly at the time Columbus discovered new coasts and Luther preached his
creed.3 A self-congratulatory stress on progress and improvement is now rare
among established academic historians. Yet they can still choose to deﬁne early
modern history as a special mixture of change and continuity, as an instance of
what German historians have called the ‘simultaneity of the unsimultaneous’
(Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen), citing the words of Ernst Bloch in diﬀerent
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contexts.4 C. B. A. Behrens, in her old but still stimulating study of ancien re´gime
France, comes close to this deﬁnition for her speciﬁc period of study, 1750–1789,
underlining the contradictions inherent in dynastic re´gimes confronted by the need
to tap the wealth of their elites, yet still quite dependent on these pillars of mon-
archy.5 The antecedents of the label ‘early modern’ remain inextricably tied to the
idea of modernization. Economic expansion and diversiﬁcation, state building,
changes in mentalities and patterns of life characterize early modern history –
yet so do the resilience of the hierarchical conception of society and the socially
pervasive sense of regionalism or corporatism. Clearly all phases in history expe-
rience contradictions, innovations, changing ways and resilient patterns – this is the
substance of what we study. Was the age between c. 1500 and 1800 special largely
because it prepared the changeovers of the so-called Sattelzeit (Reinhard
Koselleck’s term for the period of transition ca. 1750–1850) and revolutions?6
Few early modernists would accept this perspective, based as it is on hindsight
and being uncomfortably close to teleology.
Recent debates about the ‘Rise of the West’ add more reasons for doubt, by
pointing out, for instance, that developments in China until the later eighteenth
century show patterns of economic, cultural and political change reminiscent of
European history in the same age.7 Increasing global interdependence complicates
the comparison from the late eighteenth century onwards, with Europe gradually
establishing military superiority over even the strongest of Asian powers, imposing
priorities that changed the course of developments in Asia. Nevertheless, the com-
parative perspective poses the question as to when and why levels of change
reached a point of no return, starting a ‘take oﬀ’ into the as yet uncharted
domain of modernity, rather than inaugurating yet another cyclical turn in history.
A major impulse among early modernists in recent decades has been to accept
higher levels of continuity both with earlier and later ages, stressing the persistence
of Alteuropa even after the impact of an early industrializing economy and the
violent redeﬁnitions of political organization and interaction.8
The declining appeal of linear sociological perspectives based on nineteenth-
century theorists of modernity among historians went hand in hand with an
increasing inﬂuence of anthropology – a discipline which itself in the course of
the twentieth century largely exchanged the evolutionary perspectives of its found-
ing fathers for a diametrically opposed position once critically described as ‘devel-
opmental agnosticism’.9 For most historians, there is an obvious intermediate
position, studying change within a limited period, while refraining from ﬁtting
historical data into a standard mould of progress. Anthropology provides frame-
works for the analysis of semi-universal human practices, but at the same time
stimulates ‘micro-historical’ approaches. These diﬀerent aspects are reﬂected in the
work of, respectively, Jack Goody on succession, kinship and marriage, and
Cliﬀord Geertz on the ‘theatre-state’ and ‘thick description’.10 More generally,
by focusing on recurring structures, historical anthropology makes room for syn-
chronic as well as diachronic comparative views. For historians of pre-modern
ages, the latter will implicitly always be present in two directions. Like all
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historians, they take images of their own age as a starting point while looking
at earlier history, whether they like it or not. After becoming familiar with the
diﬀerent mentalities and practices of the age studied, however, they necessarily look
diﬀerently at their contemporary environments. Arguably, historians share in mit-
igated form the ‘reverse culture shock’ experienced by anthropologists upon return-
ing to their own culture after a protracted phase of ﬁeldwork – and students of the
pre-modern age may do so more evidently than those concentrating on relatively
contemporary and familiar settings. Thus, for example, instead of understanding
modern political culture largely in self-referential terms such as democracy, civil
society, public sphere, rule of law, impersonal bureaucracy, pre-modernists are
likely to recognize patterns of representation, ritual, redistribution, patronage,
brokerage, and elites as entirely familiar from earlier history. This perception
does not obscure or deny fundamental change, but it helps to reduce overstated
and value-laden contrasts.
A brief look at the dynastic court can show the advantages of explicit and
methodical comparison along synchronic and diachronic lines. In his path-break-
ing study of the French court Norbert Elias intertwined a perceptive analysis of
court life with his broader conception of a ‘civilizing process’.11 Elias, worthy
successor to theorists of modernity from Marx to Weber, presented the interaction
between Louis XIV and his nobles at court as an empirical demonstration of his
model of long-term psychological change (Langzeitpsychologie). However, very
similar patterns of interaction (deference, ceremony, status competition, factions)
can be found at courts throughout history, indicating that they cannot simply be
accepted as building blocks in a European process of transformation. Diachronic
comparison of dynastic households is necessary to diﬀerentiate between elements
apparently related to the household’s structure and function that recur in various
ages, and elements that seem particular for one period only, and therefore require
distinct contextual explanations. A thematic history of this institution, therefore,
cannot respect classic period divides, even if they seem to separate phases thor-
oughly distinct in many ways – and it need not respect geographical boundaries
either, although language diﬀerences complicate matters here.12 Moments of
change and reconstruction generate source material making possible comparison
across the ages, allowing us to examine recurring waves of institutional reform
from the ﬁfteenth into the nineteenth century. During my archival studies on the
courts of Vienna and Versailles, I was struck by the insistent repetition of very
similar phrases in reform texts in the course of three centuries and in two realms.
Instructions for chamber servants, for example, reiterate rules forbidding them to
accept and pass on petitions, clearly a common occurrence based on their proxim-
ity to the ruler. In stark contrast to the conspicuous luxury and solemn ceremonial
order often underlined in secondary literature, court ordinances throughout these
centuries bewail the confusion ruling everyday routines, display grave budgetary
concerns, dictate norms approaching frugality, and lay down procedures for care-
fully monitoring expenditure. Similar concerns and complaints can be found at
courts in other places and periods, even where connections and inﬂuences were
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wholly absent. Apparently, institutional logic caused problems that evoked parallel
responses.13
In addition, synchronic comparison corrects reputations based on an isolated
perception of one ‘national’ example only. Comparing Vienna and Versailles, I was
surprised to ﬁnd diﬀerences in the attitudes of noble courtiers as well as in their
terms of oﬃce-holding that contrasted markedly with the reputations of these
courts.14 French noble courtiers, usually depicted as docile and impotent after
the end of the Fronde rebellion, held semi-hereditary positions at court and were
able to accumulate numerous lucrative privileges. A small group of families
monopolized high oﬃce at court, and used this base to secure a dominant position
in regional government, army command and diplomacy.15 The king, successfully
drawing grandees to the court after the Fronde rebellion, thus helped to create an
exclusive elite that would end only with monarchy itself. In Vienna, no single
family obtained a hereditary right to high court oﬃce, and the pool of families
hoping for nomination remained far larger than the closed French circle. Court
oﬃce usually followed only after long and loyal service in a cursus honorum of
lesser oﬃces. Wages were unimpressive, and while extras could be very substantial,
they remained an exceptional grace in the hands of the emperor. Habsburg cour-
tiers were more deferential and (somewhat) less given to quarrelling than their
haughty French compeers. These diﬀerences can easily be explained. Venality of
oﬃce, though never fully accepted at court, determined the hereditary nature of
oﬃce-holding in France; it remained the exception in Vienna. French courtiers,
notably among them the Conde´ grand maıˆtre, were relatively close to the king
in rank; they were the highest echelon in the state. The emperor’s noble servants
from the various Habsburg lands were more distant in rank, and eager to serve, as
they could use the court to establish and consolidate their position at the level of
the empire and Europe.16 In fact, the emperor’s high noble rivals, his nominal
‘imperial courtiers’, were the electors and princes, who would only incidentally
visit Vienna. The emperor, frequently depicted as a weak ﬁgure ruled by powerful
magnates, at his court was relatively successful in managing the elites from his
hereditary domains. National images of Louis reconstituting the French state
after the Fronde and Leopold as the ineﬀective post-Westphalian emperor who
could neither rule the empire nor modernize his own domains created reputations
that were half-truths at best.
In such national trajectories, the 1640s–1660s often serve as a major milestone.
This habit has persisted in the organization of historical research, rarely extending
from the early Reformation to the later seventeenth century, or from the wars of
religion to the French revolutionary wars. Syntheses tend to cover the period from
the later middle ages to Westphalia, or alternatively from the post-1650 reconsti-
tution of stability to the phase of reform and turbulence in the later eighteenth
century, rarely from one extreme to the other.17 National histories or textbooks
focusing on political history will tell the entire story, but they more than any other
approach stick to conventional dates and images underlining the genesis of states
and nations. The stress on 1648 derives from the traditional view of the rise of state
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power and the construction of sovereignty. It has never been eﬀectively reassessed
or newly conceptualized.18 The 1650s ended a period of particularly intense con-
testation in Europe – among states, groups, ideas. Concentrating on longer-term
processes rather than on the sharp contrast between rebellion and the restoration,
we can see trends continuing from the 1550s into the later years of the seventeenth
century. While, indisputably, the machinery of the state expanded in these decades,
forms of power, patronage, and decision-making retained familiar traits. Was this
a new ‘administrative monarchy’ pointing towards the future, or in fact a restate-
ment of traditional forms, a ‘baroque monarchy’ with dynastic policies and per-
sonal connections occupying pride of place?19 Recent work tends to support the
latter view. From a political point of view it makes sense to stress the consolidation
of states and elites after the protracted phase of religious warfare; from a cultural
perspective there is reason to point to a change in mentality, once captured by
Hazard in the phrase ‘crise de la conscience europe´enne’.20 There is little reason,
however, to accept the boundary of the 1650s, based as much on convenience
and on traditional assumptions about change as on actually tested and conﬁrmed
patterns of change.
The same holds true for the classic period markers of medieval, early modern,
and modern history. Research should overstep and re-examine these divides rather
than reverently respect them. Co-operation between specialists of the later Middle
Ages and students of the sixteenth century seems relatively easy.21 The late eight-
eenth-century divide exerts a far more powerful inﬂuence. It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd
books on state formation and political culture which convincingly integrate key
questions before and after the great divide of 1789–1815. Specialized studies deal
with social continuities at the rural, urban or elite levels22 – yet general political
syntheses more often than not study the changeover emphatically from the per-
spective of either the eighteenth or the nineteenth century. The French Revolution
therefore in practice still acts both as the endpoint of the ancien re´gime, and as the
springboard for modern developments. The phase of renewed warfare, ﬁscal crisis,
reform and intense debate starting in the 1740s occupies a kind of middle ground
and has its own group of specialists, standing between early modernists and
modern historians.
If early modern history cannot be understood as an extended variant of the
Sattelzeit, what in fact characterized it, in Europe and on a global scale? Do
these three centuries share characteristics that set them apart from earlier and
later ages? While academic curricula will include introductory courses in early
modern history, and history departments have early modern chairs and sections,
research in practice tends to be organized not along the lines of early modern
history in its entirety, but in smaller segments, often connected to centuries.
Titles of academic historical journals underline the surprising importance of cen-
turies, these convenient yet empty vessels of history. Alongside established national
historical periodicals, century-based journals predominate in most languages
(admittedly often reﬂecting an interdisciplinary approach, including literary and
art-historical perspectives). It is inevitable and entirely justiﬁable that research
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focus on shorter periods and more detailed questions, yet we need studies crossing
the habitual borders, such as Keith Thomas’s various studies on early modern
England or John Elliott’s comparative study of the Spanish and the British in
the Americas, to remind us of the recurring themes and questions of early
modern history as a whole. Elliott shows how reputations of the modern
Americas had distorted interpretations of the earlier period. He examines and
compares changes in the connections between the central governments in Europe
and the American colonies during a very long phase, but also deals with example,
imitation, and interaction between the colonies. His book conveys a recognizably
‘early modern’ ﬂavour of regionalism, the persistent discourse of privilege, and the
inconsistencies of ongoing government reform.23
A wider comparative horizon including other empires in Eurasia can help to
reassess the contours of a speciﬁcally early modern phase in global history – neither
entirely separated from the questions of change and modernization, nor wholly
dictated by the limited premises of the Whig interpretation of history. Jack
Goldstone perspicaciously denied the general validity of ‘early modern’ as a
period label in world history, presenting alternatives based on economic develop-
ment. Craig Clunas depicts a vibrant Ming culture, in many ways close to simul-
taneous developments in Europe. Conversely, On-Cho Ng’s comparison of
Europe’s intellectual changeover in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to
developments in Ming and Qing China, tends to conﬁrm the distinctiveness
of the European case. Viktor Lieberman’s wide-ranging comparison of processes
of state-formation and integration in Eurasia underlines similar tendencies, while at
the same time he diﬀerentiates between cultures inﬂuenced permanently by Central
Asian migration and more distant territories. Sanjay Subramahnyam analyses sev-
eral intriguing connections, interactions, and conjunctures in the early modern
world. Among other studies, such works in diﬀerent and not necessarily compatible
ways contribute to the comparative silhouette of early modern Europe.24
States, Nations, Empires and Regions
The nation-states of Europe play an overwhelming role in traditional as well as in
current historiography. In an age of increasingly global connections, national his-
tory has remained remarkably strong – in some ways disturbingly so. The early
modern period, traditionally pictured as the phase in which states gradually took
shape, forms a marked component in modern national identities. Several European
countries locate their ﬁnest hours and golden ages in the sixteenth, seventeenth, or
eighteenth centuries. The perception of success apparently leaves a strong imprint.
The French grand sie`cle oﬀers a case in point,25 but the Dutch situation is equally
remarkable. Dutch commercial supremacy, cultural ﬂourishing, and military
power, arising within decades after the uneasy inception of the Dutch Republic,
appeal to a wider Dutch public, a privileged position shared only by the Second
World War, and possibly by the later Dutch overseas empire in the East Indies.
Dutch early modernists, usually reading several languages and concentrating on
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European rather than Dutch history in teaching, almost without exception deﬁne
their research primarily in terms of Dutch sources and Dutch themes, connected
more often than not to the Revolt and the Golden Age. The less glamorous eigh-
teenth century long remained terra incognita, whereas the history of the Southern
Netherlands was often left out of the picture. In fact, the current generation seems
more closely focused on Dutch history than were their predecessors a generation
ago.26 This supposition needs a more thorough substantiation; yet if it proves
correct, and particularly if it is equally relevant for other countries, it raises
thorny questions. How can this reorientation be squared with an increasingly glob-
alized academic world, strongly inﬂuenced by interdisciplinary, international and
transnational approaches, and partly funded by institutions on the whole support-
ive of innovative eﬀorts? Can it be connected to a change in the general public, with
a renewed interest in the icons of national history? While the public attitude can
possibly be understood as a strengthened need for identity and conﬁrmation in an
age of global change and insecurity, we would expect diﬀerent attitudes among
professional historians. A long-standing obligation of the post-1945 generations of
historians has been to go beyond the predominantly national orientation of the
authoritative late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century constructions of national
identity. That endeavour has been quite successful in terms of widening the social
and thematic scope of history. Thus far it has been less eﬀective in providing a
comparative view of the key issues of political history in the early modern age. In
addition to general overviews of European history and general interpretations of
state building, most monographs dealing with political history take one state as a
starting point.
Interestingly, foreign historians have often been instrumental in connecting the
national past to wider horizons. Geoﬀrey Parker’s work on the Dutch Revolt and
the army of Flanders, for example, introduced a fresh view based on Spanish and
Flemish sources.27 Parker’s role among Dutch historians is representative of a
wider category of ‘outsiders’ playing a major role in the rewriting of European
continental history. On the whole, British and American early modernists appear
to have been more willing to learn the languages and study the archives of other
countries than have many of their continental European counterparts. The revision
of French ‘absolutism’, for instance, was initiated by British and American histo-
rians, with William Beik and Roger Mettam, among others, opening a discussion in
which French participation long remained limited.28 German and Spanish history,
too, were revitalized in part by English-language historians – John Elliott’s work
has already been mentioned here. Relative outsiders, learning languages and cross-
ing cultural borders while often simultaneously teaching national history, become
implicit comparatists, taking distance from standardized national accounts and
asking diﬀerent questions. Nationals concentrating on their own history lack this
advantage, particularly when they study the ‘ﬁnest hours’ of their past.
The Holy Roman Empire, a political structure never unambiguously embraced
by national historians, has recently attracted lively scholarship and debate. The
empire in the early modern age, long seen in terms of the decay of the medieval
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empire and the humiliating defeat through Bourbon-induced Kleinstaaterei, by
both German and Austrian historians, has now been reinterpreted in many more
positive ways.29 Apparently, it is easier for historians to correct the negative images
of their forebears than to deﬂate the icons of the national past by putting them into
a wider European perspective. The seventeenth-century Austrian Habsburg ‘bar-
oque’ monarchy, put on the map mostly through the work of Robert Evans, oﬀers
another example where earlier negative associations facilitated the rapid reception
of a new and authoritative interpretation.30 Typically, the discussion on the Holy
Roman Empire does follow lines that echo contemporary national preoccupations:
the practices of litigation and ritual representation have been seen as ‘preﬁguring’
the post-1945 European experiment rather than as a pitiful case of lagging behind
in the process of national state formation. The very question of to what extent the
empire could be ﬁtted into more general European developments has engendered
debates that rarely arise in states with a more clear-cut trajectory of development.
The new historiography of the empire shows a vigour that matches major debates –
such as that on the French Revolution.
The Empire, largely German-speaking, arguably one ‘communicative space’
(Kommunikationsraum) sharing an increasingly dense ‘public sphere’, shifts the
issue from national to regional and European history. In Central and Eastern
Europe, politically connected to the empire and likewise rarely seen as the ‘heart-
land’ of early modern processes of modernization, a lively tradition of historical
scholarship combining wider regional perspectives with high levels of language
expertise has developed.31 Can the regions of Europe still usefully serve as points
of orientation for research? The regional divisions of European history, notably
East versus West of the Elbe, or the ‘core lands’ of Western Europe along the
Atlantic and North Sea coasts, versus areas in the North, South, and East of
Europe are intertwined with the modernization paradigm.32 Economic moderniza-
tion has usually been linked to the shift from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic
Ocean in the long sixteenth century, and to regional specialization and the devel-
opment of ‘second serfdom’ in Central and Eastern Europe. Political moderniza-
tion has most often been connected to standard models in Britain and France, with
the Dutch Republic in a subsidiary role. After deﬁning the North-West as the
heartland, subsequent modernizing or ‘Westernizing’ tendencies in terms of culture,
economy, state building and warfare could be construed elsewhere: in
Brandenburg-Prussia, Austria, or Russia. Alternatively, regions could be seen as
missing this opportunity, lacking the potential for change. The classic opposition
between the ‘old decaying empires’ and new rising states comes to mind – a frame-
work that cannot be upheld in its cruder form, as new research both on the Holy
Roman Empire and the Ottoman empire shows.33
A regional perspective can highlight the importance of lower-level identities and
loyalties, which were often more important than those at the distant central polit-
ical level. Conversely, it can show interactions not limited to one political centre:
Scandinavian or Italian-Iberian connections; the Habsburg network of dynastic
possessions. Alternatively, it can sidestep the political criterion altogether, deﬁning
614 European History Quarterly 40(4)
regions on the basis of landscape and geography. Fernand Braudel pioneered this
approach in his study on the Mediterranean; his example has been followed eﬀec-
tively for other seas, for example the Indian Ocean.34 Seas, rivers, mountain ranges
can form the starting point for studying cultural, social and economic interactions.
Regions were meeting points and thoroughfares for persons, groups, objects and
ideas. Trade routes, patterns of army and refugee movement, religious conversions
and migrations, the spread of pamphlets and books, networks of correspondences
or cultural fashions of many kinds rarely conformed neatly to political borders.
Nor did political entities themselves ﬁt the principle of nationality. Regions
defended vehemently their political privileges and rights; dynastic power itself,
even if it necessarily embraced and to a certain extent embodied age-old cultural
forms of the realms over which it ruled, was ﬁrst and foremost a highly interna-
tional family business. Rulers of dynastic composite states, moreover, tended to
address the heterogeneous components of their realms in very diﬀerent voices. The
term ‘transnational’, coined as a commentary on the omnipresence of national
perspectives, seems somewhat out of place in early modern history. Even historians
who in practice concentrate their research on national history usually acknowledge
‘transnational’ patterns in the early modern age as a general and therefore arguably
unremarkable phenomenon.
In addition to numerous overviews and syntheses, several types of publications
deal with political history at the European level: volumes bringing together spe-
cialists from various countries or individual attempts to attain higher levels of
abstraction. The publications of Charles Tilly, notably his Coercion, Capital, and
European States, ranks among the most inﬂuential works of the second category.35
The problem of such generalizing studies is that they necessarily rely on secondary
literature, sometimes using outdated views as the basis for generalized claims.
Hence they risk restating and reinvigorating national typologies in the process –
Ludovician ‘absolutism’; the uncourtly Prussian army-based Beamtenstaat and the
like. In this respect, multi-authored volumes can be more eﬀective because they
bring together specialists. The ESF-sponsored project on the ‘Origins of the
Modern State in Europe: 13th to 18th Centuries’ published in seven volumes by
Oxford University Press is perhaps the most ambitious example of this category.36
While it includes brilliant contributions, it suﬀers from the customary problem of
conference volumes: uneven quality of papers. Moreover, conference volumes often
fail to eﬀectively synthesize the various cases described, and therefore remain
inconclusive. In the end, individual comparative work, on the basis of language
competence and archival research, seems an indispensable supplement to generalist
studies based on secondary literature and edited volumes.37 However, such works
remains the exception in early modern political history.
While uniformity or proximity in language facilitated communication in the
past, it was never a precondition – as Braudel’s Mediterranean shows. In his letters
to his friend and ambassador Count Po¨tting, Emperor Leopold I nimbly jumps
from German to Spanish, Italian, to Latin – creating a powerful personal idiom.38
Leopold’s linguistic versatility must have been an exception. Certainly, a critical
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discourse existed on the inﬂuence of foreign languages: Italian in the French con-
text, French in the German or Dutch contexts. Elites demanded the adaptation of
incoming dynastic rulers and their spouses to cherished local traditions, whereas
the ‘foreign’ followings accompanying new rulers frequently triggered vehement
arguments.39 On the whole, however, early modern sources remind us of the
refreshingly unprincipled use of language in the age. Languages structure and
facilitate current academic practice, but they also delineate limitations. English
increasingly serves as the lingua franca of the academic world. This assists ﬂuent
communication during many international conferences, yet it connects only a lim-
ited selection of scholars. Multi-language conferences can be a surprising experi-
ence, with the international audience breaking up into smaller language-based
groups. Even within Europe, languages still represent a major stumbling block.
How many languages do we have to master to qualify as a historian of Europe, as a
comparative historian, or a world historian? It is easier to learn languages in one
family than to turn from Spanish to German or Russian – let alone to Persian,
Arabic or Chinese.
Direct communication among scholars is only the least of the problems con-
nected to language. It is hardly in the commercial interest of publishers to translate
learned monographs, and almost all primary sources will be available only in their
original language. Language capabilities are a necessary condition for European as
well as for wider comparative history. This is a matter of some concern, as language
training in many school systems seems to be becoming less eﬀective40 or alterna-
tively less attractive for students who can justiﬁably see English as their only nec-
essary vehicle into the modern world. This, indeed, may be one of the drawbacks of
globalization.
Comparative History and the ‘Voices’ from the Past
Early modern European history, whenever possible and relevant, needs to include
in its research the entire phase from the fourteenth-century crisis up to the revo-
lutionary wave of the late 1840s. Conventional boundaries with medieval and
modern history, as well as the implicit and pragmatic dividing line of the 1650s,
need to overstepped systematically: these phases of change demand special scru-
tiny. In this open and questioning form, rather than as the classic roadmap towards
modernity, the early modern age remains a vital focus of research and teaching,
with a cluster of phenomena linked to it, ranging from the printing press and
Reformation, to economic expansion, the emergence of an increasingly interdepen-
dent world, and the ongoing redeﬁnition of state–elite–populace relations.
The political history of European states is full of untested reputations. Only
through comparison can we hope to establish standards detached from the trajec-
tories of national history, informed and corrected by synchronic as well as dia-
chronic comparative perspectives. However, comparative research based largely on
secondary literature, or asymmetric comparisons based on unequal levels of knowl-
edge, can repeat or even strengthen narrow national reputations. A symmetric
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comparative approach based systematically on roughly equivalent research in pri-
mary sources rather than on the study of secondary literature, is indispensable to
go beyond national stereotypes. This process, moreover, can no longer stop at the
frontiers of Europe, wherever we locate them. European history takes shape only
as a speciﬁc variant of social, cultural and political patterns seen elsewhere.
Europe, in fact, has always been deﬁned in opposition to cultures or forces seen
as diﬀerent.41 Teaching and research demand a balanced mixture of regional,
national, European, and global perspectives. European generalists, primarily
those who study cultures and countries outside their national tradition, can play
a key role here. There is little reason for a defensive posture against a ‘take-over’ by
world history, as long as it is not understood as a bland mixture of generalized
examples, parallels and diﬀerences, distant from the experiences of human actors.
It needs to be studied at the level of sources, asking speciﬁc thematic questions,
providing answers at the level of texts and persons rather than producing a cata-
logue of civilizations or systems. In-depth comparison on a global scope demands
extensive knowledge as well as language capabilities that cannot be achieved easily
by individual scholars, and therefore requires new forms of research cooperation.42
This challenge needs to be addressed.
National history as well as the narrowly European modernization perspective,
prime movers of an earlier generation, have run out of steam. Their demise has
implications for classic deﬁnitions of European as well as early modern history. An
eﬀort is necessary to relocate and redeﬁne Europe in the early modern world. The
contours of European history, itself a conglomerate of disparate cases, are deter-
mined partly by the question of what made it diﬀerent from others. This can be
ascertained by studying global connections and perceptions, as well as by a focused
comparison of patterns and structures. In the process we can verify whether ‘early
modern’ as a period label has a special quality and connotation both for Europe
and for the wider world; whether it is relevant only or mostly for Europe – or
indeed whether it needs to be redeﬁned even more thoroughly.
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